Even their uniforms were hastily crafted and not ideally suited to fighting in the bush. The majority of the arriving troops had no such indoctrination and had been readied at an accelerated pace. While counterinsurgency by its nature requires substantial numbers of light infantry, the force must be trained in the craft of fighting a `small war' to be effective. Following the uprisings of March 1961 in the north of Angola, Portugal poured troops into the colony as fast as its creaking logistic system would allow however, these new arrivals were not competent and did not possess the skills needed to fight a counterinsurgency.
It was almost completely unprepared to do so, and this was particularly evident in its ability to project power and to control the vast colonial spaces of Africa. In 1961, Portugal found itself fighting a war to retain its colonial possessions and preserve the remnants of its Empire.
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